

25X1

B/Ed

25X1

Copy No. 8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
6 MAY 1953

MAY 4TH CONSULTATION

25X1 25X1

[redacted] It is his view that these two leaders have always been close and that they are today in agreement. To demonstrate their past relations, [redacted] discussed the history of the development of the Comintern from the early 20's to the present.

25X1

25X1

In the 1st period from 1920 (the 2nd Comintern Congress) to 1928 (the 6th Comintern Congress) the biggest problem for the Kremlin was to place the Comintern apparatus in Moscow under its control and thereby control the foreign communist parties. This period was marked, however, by a relative independence of the Comintern and the foreign communist parties.

Between 1925-1928 front organizations were developed. These front organizations were not connected with the local parties but were run by the Moscow apparatus which was often in disagreement with the national parties. The front organizations were thus a source of friction. The Moscow "illegal" apparatus was a group of trusted specialists set up to control the national parties from Moscow and was illegal even to the Comintern which theoretically was composed of equal Communist parties.

Two types of political activities were carried out - the conventional class struggle and national struggles. For these activities Stalin developed a new type of diplomat who utilized both types of struggle and both organs: the illegal apparatus and the foreign Communist parties. Zarubin and Gromyko are examples of these diplomats. Zarubin, as early as 1936 began secret proceedings for the Nazi-Soviet pact.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] when the Comintern was "dissolved" in 1943, control of the illegal apparatus was transferred from the Central Committee to Beria's NKVD. Trusts and projects for propaganda and schools were developed to replace the Comintern operations and these were run by the illegal apparatus now under Beria's jurisdiction.

1

1  
[redacted]  
Class. Stamped To: TS S G  
Auth: RM 10-2  
Date: 11 JUL 1978

25X1

25X1

At the first meeting of the Cominform in Warsaw in 1947 Malenkov attended along with Zhdanov. Because Malenkov held no official position at this time, and certainly no position that would give him a reason for being at the Cominform meeting, [ ] assumes that during this period he was allowed by Beria to use the illegal apparatus. [ ] believes that Malenkov had run the illegal comintern apparatus as well as the Central Committee Apparatus from 1943 to 1946, indicating his close relationship with Beria. He also suggested that Stalin sent Malenkov to check on Zhdanov, using the well known "Stalin system" of putting two men against each other.

25X1

25X1

Concerning post-war developments [ ] believes that there were three separate lines being developed between 1946 and 1948. Zhdanov had instituted a campaign on political and literary propaganda, charging that Soviet culture was not nationalistic enough and that it insufficiently attacked bourgeois remnants. Malenkov had been critical of the peasant economy and felt that the Kolkhozes were not carrying out the model collective farm statute of 1935.

25X1

At the same time, there was a critical battle raging between Zhdanov and Malenkov concerning the size and composition of the party. Zhdanov, in the orthodox Leninist tradition, thought that the party had grown too large in the war and its ideological standards were suffering and therefore it should be made smaller and more select, while Malenkov believed it should be enlarged to include more managerial bureaucrats. On this question, Malenkov lost out and an article in Pravda July 1946 by Zadionchenko condemned some of his concepts. Another indication of his loss in prominence was his exclusion from the new Council for Collective Farm Affairs headed by his enemy Andreyev. Malenkov then took "another road to power" by concentrating on agronomical improvements: shelter belts, irrigation projects, reforestation etc.

25X1

Malenkov and Zhdanov were in conflict also on their ideas concerning the West, Zhdanov felt that the collapse of capitalism and a consequent revolution were imminent, while Malenkov believed that this orthodox concept was no longer true. Varga's economic work was written while Malenkov was in control of the Secretariat and expressed Malenkov's views in opposition to Zhdanov. Stalin was willing to give Zhdanov an opportunity

25X1D

25X1

to experiment with the idea that revolutions were imminent in the West, but Tito's defection in 1948 and Western successes during the Berlin Blockade convinced him that this was a faulty experiment.

During the period of Zhdanov's ascendancy Varga and his concepts were condemned, but after Zhdanov's death in 1948, Varga was allowed by Malenkov to refute his attackers in the journal Questions of Economics and in Pravda. [redacted] suggested that Zhdanov's death was not a natural one.

25X1

[redacted] stated in answer to a question that it is true that Stalin attacks some of Varga's ideas in his Bolshevik article but that this does not affect Varga's status because no one who had expressed such unorthodox views could be entirely rehabilitated.

25X1

Turning to individuals and their relations with Malenkov, [redacted] expressed the view that Ignatiev was not a Malenkov protege as is so often asserted but that his connection was with Stalin through Poskrebyshev, Stalin's personal Secretary. He felt that the real key to an understanding of Ignatiev's connections lay in the period of the early 1940's for which, unfortunately, there is no available information on the positions he held.

25X1

[redacted] thought there was a strong possibility that Malenkov was married to a daughter of Khrushchev, whose name is Eleana. At any rate, he noted that the Ukrainian press, formerly under Khrushchev, who was Ukraine's First Secretary for many years, is currently much more favorable to Malenkov than any other. He also noted the Moscow Pravda, the newspaper of the Moscow City Committee whose first Secretary had been Khrushchev, was also pro-Malenkov, and concluded that Khrushchev, at present at least, can be counted in the Malenkov camp.

25X1

Concerning Suslov, another member of the All-Union Secretariat, [redacted] considered that he had straddled the fence at the time of the Zhdanov-Malenkov battle and having successfully weathered that period had then become a protege of Malenkov. He feels that Suslov is a government man, that is one who feels that the government technicians and managers are more important to the Soviet Union than the party functionary who has no technical training.

25X1

In the few remaining moments, [redacted] turned to some interesting speculation concerning Malenkov and his relations with the party functionaries in the Central Committee Apparatus. He expressed the view that Malenkov, although he had made his

25X1

25X1

own way as a worker in the Central Committee Apparatus and as a party functionary, as a result of his wartime government work now felt that the Apparatus was too large and had too much power. [ ] feels that there is a struggle going on between those individuals "close to the masses" - the local party secretaries and government bureaucrats - and the central party functionaries in the Apparatus. In this struggle, Malenkov agrees with those "close to the masses", and we can expect, in [ ] view a diminution in the size and importance of the central apparatus. [ ]

This should not be considered a lessening of the party's power, however, but rather a fusion of government personnel with party experience and party personnel with government experience, into a new power group. Unfortunately, there was not enough time for [ ] to develop this theme with fuller explanations.